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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
CENTURY PARK OFFICES, LTD.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
WILLIAM R. BIRELEY,
Case No. 900292-CA
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) because this is an
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil matter in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

This matter was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court

to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2-2(4) in an order dated October 11, 1990.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constituted an

election by Century Park to terminate the lease.
2.

Whether Century Park deprived Bireley of possession of

the leased premises and is consequently barred from claiming an
enforceable lease after November 6, 1987.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court should review this question of law under
a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the trial
court.

Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 8,

9 (Utah 1990); In re D.S.K.. 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The Utah courts have not decided the issue presented on
appeal in this case; therefore, defendant/appellant relies upon
authority from Colorado:

Aigner v. Cowell Sales Co., 660 P.2d

907 (Colo. 1983) (copy attached); G.T. Investments v. Depot,
Inc., 694 P.2d 379 (Colo. App. 1984); Duran v. Housing Authority,
761 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo. 1988) ("it is established law in
Colorado that the three-day notice to quit . . . constitutes an
election by the landlord to terminate the lease").
RELATED APPEAL
Appellant believes that W. Daniel English v. Standard
Optical Co., Case No. 900422-CA, presently on appeal to this
Court involves similar issues to the instant appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order of the Fourth District
Court granting judgment to Century Park Offices, Ltd. and from
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the Fourth District Court's final order denying appellant's
Motion to Amend the Judgment.
In its Memorandum Decision filed April 5, 1990, the trial
court determined:
(a)

There was a valid lease between the parties;

(b)

The addendum requiring the lessee/defendant to pay

for improvements to the leased property was unenforceable;
(c)

Based on defendant's failure to pay rent,

lessor/

plaintiff served defendant with a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit;
(d)

Defendant elected to quit the premises pursuant to

the Notice;
(e)

Despite the Notice and ensuing election of

remedies, defendant remained liable to plaintiff for rental
payments on the leased property for the duration of the lease
term.

(Court's Memorandum Decision, Addendum A.)
Defendant timely moved this Court for an Order altering or

amending the Judgment.

Defendant requested only that the judg-

ment be amended to find that the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit
constituted an election by the landlord to terminate the lease.
In accordance with case law and with the default provision in the
lease, defendant argued he should not be held responsible for
rental payments accruing after the eviction.

The court denied

defendant's motion.
The only issue before the Court on this Appeal is whether
the lease was terminated at the time the Notice to Pay Rent or
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Quit was served on defendant.

Defendant agrees that damages

incident to default prior to the eviction can be recovered;
subsequent to the termination of the lease, the question of
damages is not at issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are undisputed and are derived from the
court's Memorandum Decision, the Trial Transcript and Exhibits
and the pleadings on file.
On December 14, 1985, appellant, William R. Bireley
("Bireley"), and Century Park Offices, Ltd. ("Century Park"),
entered into a lease agreement with respect to certain office
space.

Beginning in the fall of 1986, a conflict arose regarding

who should pay for improvements to the leased office space.
Bireley paid rent and utilities on the leased premises through
and including March 1987 with the exception of February 1987. At
the end of March, Bireley ceased paying rent.

Beginning in

April, Bireley sublet the premises in exchange for monthly
payments of approximately one thousand dollars.
On August 3, 1986, Century Park filed a lawsuit in the
Fourth District Court demanding payment for the remodeling
expenses it had incurred in connection with the leased office
space.

Not until January of 1990 did Century amend its Complaint

to include a claim for unrecovered rent under the lease term.
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Century Park served Bireley with a "Landlord's Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit," addressed to both Bireley and his sublessee,
Michael Blair ("Blair"), on November 3, 1987.
B.)

(Notice, Addendum

The Notice is specific and it is stated in the disjunctive:

either pay or deliver up possession.

Given the alternatives,

Bireley and Blair opted to quit the premises and delivered up
possession of the office space to Century Park three days after
receipt of the Notice.

(Trial Transcript, pp. 28, 33, 71-2.)

After November 6, 1987, Bireley never once returned to the leased
premises; nor did he ever receive notice that rental payments
were expected by Century Park for the duration of the lease term.
(Transcript, p. 94.)
The trial court found that Bireley was not liable to Century
Park for the improvements to the property; this finding is not
contested.

However, the trial court held Bireley had a contin-

uing obligation under the terms of the lease agreement to pay
rent despite the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit served in November
1987.

Bireley has satisfied his obligation for delinquent rent

up until the time he and his sublessee quit the premises and now
brings this appeal as to the rent claimed after the eviction
notice was served.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Other jurisdictions considering the issue before this Court
have held that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an
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election by the landlord to terminate the lease.

Those juris-

dictions hold that lessees are only liable for rent through the
date they quit the premises upon receipt of notice by the lessor
to pay or quit.
Clear language is required to preserve the right of the
lessor to continue to recover rent under a lease after a Notice
to Pay Rent or Quit has been served upon the lessee.

In this

case, the default provisions of the lease specifically stated
that the landlord had the right to "declare this lease terminated
and the term ended and shall have the immediate right of reentry and may remove all persons and property from the leased
premises."

(Lease Agreement, Addendum C, p. 7, H 30.)

Defendant

had no way of knowing that the eviction constituted an interim
procedure.

All indications pointed to the fact that the Notice

to Pay Rent or Quit gave him the option of either paying withheld
rent or quitting the premises.

He opted to quit.

Thus, the

Notice constituted an election on the part of the landlord to
terminate the lease.
Specifically, defendant had absolutely no knowledge that
plaintiff expected him to remain liable under the terms of the
lease.

Not until January of this year, was plaintiff's Complaint

amended to include a claim for unrecovered rent under the lease
term.

Thus, from November 3, 1987 through January of 1990,

plaintiff never notified defendant of his obligation under the
lease, never billed defendant for any rental amounts, and never
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claimed any amounts as past due or owing.
not in possession.

Further, defendant was

It defies common sense as well as common law

principles to suggest defendant was bound by the lease, when he
received absolutely nothing in exchange; was not made aware of
his obligations; and had every reason to believe the lease had
been terminated.
At the very least, plaintiff had an affirmative responsibility to advise defendant that it was only attempting to
collect rent pursuant to notice; that quitting the premises was
not an election; and that relinquishing possession did not
terminate the lease.

Century Park failed to do so.

Bireley

should not be held liable for the full lease term after he quit
the premises pursuant to notice.
POINT I
THE LEASE WAS UNENFORCEABLE AFTER OCTOBER
1987 SINCE THE NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT
CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION BY CENTURY PARK TO
TERMINATE THE LEASE.
The issue of termination of the lease agreement was raised
during the bench trial because of the language contained in the
"Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" which was served on defendant.

This

Court noted in its Memorandum Decision that "that language could
be interpreted as an election of remedies."
Decision, Addendum A.)

(Memorandum

But the Court went on to conclude that

"after examination of the default provision in the lease, and the
notice served on defendant, the Court finds that plaintiff's
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intent in serving that notice was only an attempt to seek the
rent due at that time, and was not intended as an election which
would preclude future damages." Id.

Defendant brings this

appeal on the basis that the "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" was an
election of remedies by the plaintiff which effectively
terminated the lease.
The default provision in the lease provides that:
In the event of any failure of tenant to pay any rental
due hereunder within fifteen days after the same shall
be due . . . the landlord, besides other rights and
remedies it may have in law and equity, shall have the
right to relet and collect the deficiency, the right to
collect immediately for damages and shall have the
right to declare this lease terminated and the term
ended and shall have the Immediate right of re-entry
and may remove all persons and property from the leased
premises. . . .
(Entire Lease Agreement included as Addendum C.)

This default

provision gives the landlord the right to declare the lease
terminated in the event the tenant should fall behind in rental
payments due.

That is in fact what the landlord did when it

issued its "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit."

The Notice constituted

an election by the landlord to terminate the lease unless the
tenant paid rent.
While Utah courts have not addressed this specific issue, it
is the general rule in Colorado that a "Notice to Pay or Quit"
"constitutes an election by the landlord to terminate the lease
unless the Notice is rendered ineffective by the tenant's payment
of rent."

Alqner v. Cowell Sales Co., 660 P.2d 907, 908 (Colo.
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1983).

Accord. G.T. Investments v, Depot. Inc., 690 P.2d 379

(Colo. App. 1980); Duran v. Housing Authority, 761 P.2d 180
(Colo. 1988).
Other jurisdictions faced with this specific issue have also
held that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an election of
remedies; if the tenant quits the premises in response, the lease
is terminated and the tenant is no longer liable for the lease
term.

See, for example. Price v. S.S. Fuller, Inc., 639 P.2d

1003 (Alaska 1982).

The facts of this case clearly support

application of the Colorado rule.
Specifically, in Aigner, the Colorado Supreme Court
considered facts similar to those raised here.

Cowell, the

landlord, leased two units in a shopping center to Aigner.

The

term of the lease was from May 5, 1978 until April 30# 1981. On
May 2, 1979, Cowell served Aigner with a "Demand for Payment of
Rent or Possession" because Aigner was delinquent in his rent.
Within three days, Aigner vacated the premises.

Cowell leased

the premises to a new tenant on August 1, 1979.
Subsequently, Cowell brought an action against Aigner to
recover rent due under the lease for the months May, June and
July, 1979.

But the Colorado Supreme Court held that the notice

to pay or quit constituted an election by the landlord to terminate the lease unless the tenant paid rent.

Id. at 908.

"The

lessor's notice was 'analogous to a notice which one who is a
party to any terminable contract gives in order to rescind it at
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law, as distinguished from equity.1"

Id. at 909 (quoting Barlow

v. Hoffman. 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239, 201 (1938)).

The court

went on to conclude that Aigner was liable for rent only through
the date he quit the premises.

Id.

Further, it is simply unfair to require defendant to pay
rent for the entire term of the lease when he relied upon plaintiffs "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit."

The "Notice to Pay or Quit"

served upon defendant provided specifically:

"Delivering up

possession in no way releases the debtors for the delinquent rent
and utilities."

Defendant does not dispute that he owes delin-

quent rent up until the time he and his sublessee quit the
premises.1

However, defendant objects to this Court's holding

which requires him to pay rent for the entire duration of the
lease, since he quit the premises within three days of being
given the option to do so on November 3, 1987.
The Montana Supreme Court has said that:

"]n the absence of

clear language expressly preserving such a right, courts
generally will not construe a lease as providing that, upon
reentry or forfeiture, the tenant shall remain liable for accrued
rent."
(1977).

Knioht v. OMI Corp., 170 Mont. 72, 568 P.2d 552, 550
The Colorado Supreme Court of Appeals has likewise

concluded that:

*In fact, Bireley has already paid Century Park rent due
prior to November, 1987; Partial Satisfaction of Judgment,
stipulated to by the parties May 31, 1990.
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[I]n the absence of express provisions in the lease
granting the landlord the right, upon re-entry or
forfeiture, to look to the tenant for unaccrued rent, a
tenant who vacates the premises in compliance with
landlord's Notice to Pay or Quit, is not liable for
rent due under a lease for subsequent months during
which landlord was unable to rent the premises.
First National Bank of Boston v. Dvkstra, 680 P.2d 957, 958
(Colo. App. 1980); Accord. Aianer, 660 P.2d at 907; Price. 639
P.2d 1006.
The landlord's "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" gave defendant
an option.

Defendant chose to quit the premises knowing that in

doing so he would be responsible for delinquent rent and
utilities.

If plaintiff intended to hold defendant responsible

for rent and utilities for the entire term of the lease, even if
defendant exercised the option to quit, that should have been
clearly stated in the "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit."

Plaintiff

had a responsibility to advise defendant that it was only
attempting to collect rent; that quitting the premises was not an
option; and that relinquishing possession did not terminate the
lease.
If defendant had realized that he would be responsible for
rent and utilities for the entire term of the lease, he would
have at least made use of the premises himself, or would have
left the sublessee, Michael Blair, in possession so that he could
continue to collect the rent money from Blair.

Defendant relied

upon the landlord's representation that he had an option and
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changed his position in reliance upon the "Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit."
It would be patently unfair to hold that Bireley "lost all
rights, but retained all obligations of the contract."

Executive

House Bldg., Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc., 311 So.2d 604, 607
(La. App. 1975) (holding the lessor could not demand payment of
rent for the unexpired term and at the same time assert its right
to possession of the leased premises).

Accordingly, defendant is

not liable for rent which accrued subsequent to his quitting the
premises in response to the Notice to Pay or Quit.
POINT II
CENTURY PARK'S REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASED
PREMISES PRECLUDED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
LEASE AGREEMENT SINCE THERE WAS NO
CONSIDERATION HOLDING BIRELEY TO THE TERMS.
It is fundamental that a lease, like any other contract,
requires consideration to be given by both parties.

In exchange

for a tenant's agreement to pay rent, the landlord must deliver
consideration to the tenant in the form of possession of the
property.

The characteristics of a lease contract in the common

law include "a conveyance of a right of exclusive possession."
Bentlev v. Palmer House Co., 332 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1960); Bodden
v. Carbonell, 350 So.2d 927 (Fla. App. 1978); Gage v. Citv of
Topeka, 468 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1970); Wash-o-Matic Laundry Corp. v.
621 Lefferts Ave. Corp., 82 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1908); Restatement
Second of Property-Landlord and Tenantf Section 1.2 (1977).
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In the absence of this consideration from the landlord there
cannot be an enforceable lease.

As the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals has stated, "A lease is partly the conveyance of an
estate, which is deemed fully executed once the tenant takes
possession."

Matter of Hinaes, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1979).

"[I]f the lessee is deprived of peaceable possession, the
consideration for the contract fails.

It necessarily follows the

lessee's obligation to pay rent for these rights and privileges
conferred by the lease is extinguished."

Executive House Bldcr.,

Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc., supra, 311 So.2d at 607.
The evidence is unrefuted that on or about November 6, 1987,
Century Park took possession of the premises and never again
offered or conveyed possession to Bireley.

Because the evidence

at trial indicates Century Park never gave any consideration to
Bireley in exchange for a promise to continue to pay rent for the
duration of the lease term, there is no basis for any finding
that the lease was enforceable beyond the election to terminate
in November 1987.

It simply makes no sense to suggest Bireley

would agree to be bound under the lease for three additional
years in exchange for nothing.

This is particularly true in

light of the fact he had profitably sublet the premises to Blair.
CONCLUSION
Once the plaintiff, Century Park, gave Bireley the option to
pay rent or quit the premises, and once the defendant, Bireley,
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opted to quit and delivered possession there was no longer an
enforceable lease between the parties.

The Notice constituted an

election of remedies which terminated the lease.

The facts

indicate both parties acted as if this were the mutual understanding until plaintiff prepared a pretrial order raising a
claim for rent due for the entire lease term.

Case law directly

on point and common sense notions of equity require defendant
should not be held liable for payments after he quit the premises
pursuant to receiving Notice to Pay or Quit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T^W

day of November, 1990.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
y
By
George A. Hunt
Elizabeth King
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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ADDENDA
Addendum "A"

Trial Courtfs Memorandum Decision

Addendum "B"

Notice to Pay Rent or Quit

Addendum "C"

Lease Agreement
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his i IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
**********

CENTURY PARK OFFICES, LTD.f
Plaintiffs,
-vsWILLIAM R. BIRELEY,
Defendants.

Case Number

CV. 86-2213

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
**********

The Court, having conducted a bench trial on the
issues of back rents and utilities, damages, and payment for
improvements will award plaintiff a judgment of $36,947.51.
This judgment is for back rents and damages and utility
payments plus interest and a late payment through the end of
February of 1990. The Court will retain jurisdiction to award
any future damages between March 1st, 1990 and the end of the
lease term. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah
1989). The Court will not make an award for improvements.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court
finds that a valid lease exists between plaintiff and
defendant, and that that lease has not been terminated. The
issue of termination is raised because of the language used in
the notice to quit which was served on defendant. That
language could be interpreted as an election of remedies.
After examination of the default provision in the lease, and
the notice served on defendant, the Court finds that
plaintiff's intent in serving that notice was only an attempt
to seek the rent due at that time, and was not intended as an
election which would preclude future damages. Because the
Court cannot award speculative future damages, the notice only
referred to the rent owing at that time. Reid at 908. The
fact that plaintiff has since relet the premises does not
ADDENDUM "A"

release defendant from his obligations and instead serves only
to mitigate damages. Reid at 906. Because the lease was not
terminated, defendant is responsible for the payments under
the lease for rents and utilities which after subtracting the
rents received from subsequent tenants, and adding the late
penalty and interest charges provided in the agreement amount
to $36,947.51.
After consideration of the evidence presented
regarding payment for improvements, the Court finds that the
addendum providing for payment for those improvements was not
part of the lease agreement. Mr. Home, the president of the
plaintiff Corporation was experienced in real estate matters
and should have known that an unsigned addendum is not valid.
The Court further finds that the lease has an integration
clause which was unmodified. To become a valid part of the
lease, the integration clause would have to have been modified
to allow for the addendum. The Court finds that defendant is
not responsible for the cost of the improvements.
Plaintiff is only entitled to attorneys fees for time
expended in pursuing the back rents and damages pursuant to
the Contract. Plaintiff is therefore awarded $1800.00 as
attorneys fees. Plaintiff is awarded costs«
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with the terms
of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the court for
signature.
Dated this 15th day of March, 1920.
BY

RA

cc:

George A. Hunt, Esq.
Robert Moody, Esq.
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HARDING, JUDGE

LANDLORD'S NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT
7o. .William R. Birelej and Jtochael E. B ^ i r

„

You are hereby notified and required within three days from mrnct of this notice to pty the rent
of the premises hereinafter described, and of which you now hold posmsion, amounting to the turn of
Twelve Thousand .Six Hundred Ninety-Seven...and..43/ 100-^x>oL1Ats, being the amount now due
and owing to"Cen.turj..P»^k..01£ic«sJ..Lt.cl..
first... day of

APEH

...October
to... Landlord

by you for..Nineteen
f

>

1987

......months* reniJ2roa u & i t i e £

19.86.., to the

&£»£.

day of

or in the alternative to deliver up pnameion of the eame

f

or ...Pe.tS.r...U.raQn

_

agent, ar...JM..~

Jhall institute legal

proceedings against you to recover possession of aaid pmniaes, with treble rata.
Said premises are situate in

Pt.PYQ

, county of fltah.

S:cte of V:ah and described as foilrws. to wit: 2696 .N....University Aye.
Delivering up possession in no way releases the debtors. f or. the delinquent..rent^
and u t i l i t i e s .

des.gr-*** and kno*r. as No.Suite. #270.f
Dated October 23rd

t

19. 8.7.

Po»« NO i a s - t-AHOLono • Nonet - K*m e» . • • w vr* •« a^att

ADDENDUM " B "

LEASE AGREEMENT

p^

This Lease
f ^fce%

Agreement i s wade t h i s * 3
day of
, 1 9 i £ f by and between C # ^ V j f v ^ r k ftffr^

L_«rrN,

. the address of which is O ^ L . J^.
» ^ ^ p fWrft ^<^K
« (hereinafter called
•Landlord) # and
L J . U I . ^ ft TfTrri ^
,
the address of which (• te ff L 7 D ^ / » A J ^ . . tJu.^.v-ft^ f*vc*
(hereinafter
called
•Tenant*)f
WITNESSETHi
UUIUA^.UM

1* LEASED PREMISES. Landlord, in consideration of the
rent to be paid and the covenants to be performed by Tenant,
does hereby demise and leaae unto Tenant, and Tenant hereby
rents from Landlord, all those premises situate, lying and
being in the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah,
and more particularly described as follows, to-witt
Suite *23Q of Horn* Financial Center . Building
No,, 2, a Condominium otxlce building at
about 2696 North UniveLSity Avenue, Trovo,
Utah, consisting of •approximately ^ g x
square feet of the &<*c^x3zgl
floor of
said building. Space will be measured to
include perimeter walls rxcept in the case
of divider partitions, and tenant shall pay
the same rental rate as provided for in
Paragraph 3 on its pro-rata share of common
area as the square footage above indicated
bears to the total square footage of the
building.
2. TERM. The rental term of this lease shall commence
on the date of completion of said premises, no later than the
£ir6t day of
or on the opening by
tenant of its business in the leased premises if prior to
total completion and shall be for a period of r<uV yj^wp^ . H^
Each of the parties hereto agrees, upon demand of the other,
to execute a declaration, in recordable form, expressing the
commencement and termination dates of the term as soon ^B the
commencement, and termination dates have been determined.
3.
RENT.
Tenant covenants and agrees to pay to
Landlord, its representatives and assigns, as rental for said
premises, the sum of *S1£LJLLJQLL
_
per square lo»t per
month, monthly in advance, on the last day of each preceedlng
month during said term, as well as the last month's rent at
the time of signing this lease, the receipt of which 1L
hereby acknowledged by Li'miJord. Should the rental term of
this lease commence on a day other than the first day of a
calendar month, then the rental for such month shall be prorated upon a daily basis based upon a thirty 130) day
calendar month*
4.
ADDITIONAL AREAS. The use and occupancy by Tenant
of the leased premises chall Include the use in common, with
others entitled thereto, of the common areas, parking a*cas,
loading facilities, sidewalks and ri'Stomer car parking treac
and of cuch oth?" facilitiea as may be designated from time
to time by Landlord, subject however, to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement and to reasonable rules and
regulations for the use thereof as prescribed from time to
time by the Landlord. Tenant and its employees shall park
their cars only in areas specifically designated from tiae to
time by Landlord for that purpose.
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5. LEASE EXPIRATION. This lease and the tenancy hereby
created shall cease at the end of the rental term hereof, or
any extension or renewal thereof, without the necessity of
any notice from cither Landlord or Tenant to terminate the
same, and Tenant hereby valves notice to vacate the premises
and agrees that Landlord shall be entitled to the benefit of
all provisions of the lav respecting the summary recovery of
possession of premises from a Tenant holding over to the same
extent as if statutory notice has been given.
6. EXCUSE OF LANDLORD'S PERFORMANCE. Anything in this
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, providing such
cause is not due to the willful act or neglect of the
Landlord, the Landlord shall not be deemed in default vith
respect to the performance of any of the terms, covenants and
conditions of this lease, if same shall be due to any strike,
lockout, civil commotion, var-like operation, invasion,
rebellion, hostilities, military or usurped pover, sabatage,
governmental regulations or controls, inability to obtain any
material, service or financing. Act of Cod, or other cause
beyond the control of Landlord.
7. REAL PROPERTY TAXES. Landlord shall be responsible
for the payment of all real property taxes and assessments
vhich may be levied or assessed by any lawful authority
against the land and building comprising the office project.
However, Tenant shall be responsible for any increase in real
property taxes above the 1963 amuunt on all buildings,
ground, common areas, etc. based upon the fraction that each
tenant or ownet's square footage bears to the total square
footage of leasable area.
8. ALL OTHER TAXES. Tenant shall be exclusively liable
for all other taxes and governmental charges of every kind
and nature whatsoever assessed against the premises, or upon
the personal property or trade fixtures or inventory suffered
or permitted by Tenant to be located upon the premises.
9.
LATE RENT CHARGES.
If Tenant shall fail to pay
within IS days after due and payable any rent or any other
amounts or charges, taxes, etc., Tenant shall pay a late fee
equal to ten percent (101) of such past Uue amount, and in
addition. Tenant shall pay interest from the due date of such
past due amounts to the date of payment, both before and
after judgment at a rate equal to the greater of Eighteen
percent (16%) per annum or two percent (2D over the "prime
rate* charged by Chase Manhattan Bank of Nev York at the due
date of such payment; provided however, that in any case the
maximum amount or rate of interest to be charged shall not
exceed the maximum non-usurious rate in accordance vith
applicable lav.
10f CONSTRUCTION OF LEASED PREMISES. Lan*«Fd agrees
prior to thesNqom.aencement of the rental tera^of this lease,
at Landlord's ^<4e cost and expense/ to construct the
building in vhirh^fct^e leased presses are to be located.
Said leased premises *h*ll be^-ctTnstructed substantially in
accordance vith the speculations attached hereto and in
title specifications vhi*ff aN^made a part hereof. Tenant
agrees that no minoj^-fTianges fram said specifications vhich
may be necessary^ouring construction of the building or
leased premises shall affect or ^change this Lease or
invalidate safne. Landlord shall also crt*e to be constructed
the necessary footvays and paiking lot facilities upon the
site. >The parties hereto agree that tenantVL occupancy of
saidxpremises as a tenant shall constitute form&L acceptance
t>af the same are in the condition called for^>«eunder,
except for any items specifically excepted in vritingSit date
of occupancy as •incomplete*.
^v
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11.
EXTENSION OP TIME. If Landlord, for any reason
whatsoever, cannot deliver possession of the premises to
Tenant at the commencement of the term specified above, then
the term fox completion by Landlord of the premises shall be
extended for sixty (60) days, which extension shall also
result in a proportionate reduction of rent covering the
period between the commencement of said term and the time
when Landlord can deliver possession.
If Landlord cannot
deliver possession during said €0 day extension, then Tenant
shall have the option to terminate this lease. Failure of
Landlord to complete the building at the time specified in
the contract will not give rise to any claim by Tenant as
against Lsndlord or against any contractor employed by
Landlord for damages that may be caused by said delay.
12.
LENDER APPROVAL.
If Landlord is able to obtain
financing for this project only upon the basis of
modifications of the terms and provisions of this Lease, then
Landlord shall have the right to cancel this Lease, if the
Tenant refuses to approve in writing any such modifications
within fifteen (15) days after Landlord's request therefore.
If Landlord chooses to exercise said right of cancellation,
this lease shall thereafter be null and void, and any money
or security deposited heceunder shall be returned to Tenant
and neither party shall have any liability to the other by
reason of such cancellation.
13.
PERMITTED USES.
Tenant shall occupy the leased
premises and use same during the continuance of this lease
solely for the purposes of office space or for any other use
permitted under the zoning ordinances applicable to said
location as may be approved by Landlord, which approval will
not be unreasonably withheld.
14. MAINTENANCE OF PREMISES. Tenant agrees to keep the
premises under its control clean and free from rubbage and
dirt at all times and shall not penetrate the exterior walls,
roofs, sidewalks or other areavays adjacent to the premises
without the prior written consent of Landlord.
Tenant further agrees 10 deliver up said premises to
Landlord at the expiration of said term in as good order and
condition as when the same were entered upon by Lessee,
reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the elements
excepted.
15.
SUBLETTING, CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP 8Y TENANT AND
ASSIGNING.
Tenant agrees not to assign this lease in whole
or in part, nor sublet all or any part of the leased
premises, nor mortgage nor encumber this lease or any part of
the leased premises, nor enter into licenses or concession
agreements or in other manner permit the occupation of or
sharing of possession of any part of the premises, nor any
assignment of this lease or any estate or Interest therein
(all of the foregoing being hereafter referred to as
"Assignment*) without the prior written consent of Landlord,
which consent may not be withheld unreasonable; subject
however, to the additional option of Landlord to terminate as
set forth hereinafter. Any assignment by operation of law,
or if the tenant be a corporation, unincorporated association
or partnership, the transfer, assignment or hypothication of
any stock or interest in such corporation, association or
partnership in the aggregate in excess of twenty five percent
(25%) shall be deemed an assignment within the meaning of
this paragraph.
In the event Tenant desires to make any such assignment,
Tenant shall serve written notice upon Landlord, and Landlord
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shall have sixty (€0) days to elect whether to approve such
assignment or to terminate the lease. Should Landlord elect
to terminate. Landlord shall so notify Tenant in writing and
Tenant shall have fifteen (15) days either to rescind the
request, or the lease shall b* deemed terminated effective at
the end of the calendar month when Landlord so elects to
terminate. Tenant's notice shall be accompanied by a copy of
a bona fide offer from a potential 'Assignee- specifying the
terms of any offer for such 'Assignee*• Should consent be
granted, such consent shall be subject to Tenant causing the
'Assignee* to execute an agreement directly with Landlord
undertaking to be bound by all of the terms, convenants and
conditions contained in the lease as though "Assignee* had
originally executed this lease as Tenant.
At no time when Tenant is in default the performance of
any covenant of this Lease or In payment of rent or any other
matured sums payable hereunder, shall any assignment be
approved or permitted, nor shall the notice provision aboveprovided limit the right to declare default and pursue other
remedies provided for in this Lease or under the laws of the
State of Utah.
Consent by Landlord to one or more assignments shall not
constitute a waiver nor consent to any subsequent assignment
nor exhaust Landlord's right as provided under any remedies
in this Lease Agreement. Any assignment without Landord's
consent shall be void and of no force and effect and shall
confer no estate or benefit of anyone, nor shall Landlord be
required to cancel the leaae in order to invalidate such
assignment and the acceptance by Landlord of any rents or any
other payment from "Assignee* shall not be deemed a waiver or
consent by Landlord or an acceptance of such assignment.
The consent of Landlord shall not relieve Tenant or any
guarantors from continuing liability under this lease.
The documentation of any such assignment shall be
prepared by Landlord or its attorneys and all costs and
reasonable attorney's fees related thereto shall be payed by
Tenant to Landlord upon demand as additional rent.
16.
USE OF COMMON AREAS*
All common areas and
facilities not within the described leased premises, which by
virtue of this Lease Tenant may be permitted to use and
occupy, are to be used and occupied under a revocable
license, ind if the amount of such areas be demini6hed,
Landlord shall not be subject to any liabilities nor shall
Tenant be entitled to any compensation or diminution or
abatement of rent, nor shall such diminution of such areas be
deemed constructive or actual eviction.
17. MODIFICATIONS BY TENANT. Tenant shall not make or
cause to be made any alterations, additions, or Improvements
to the leased premises, or install or cause to be Installed
any exterior signs, floor covering, antennas, interior or
exterior lighting, plumbing fixtures, shades, canopies or
awnings or make any changes to the exterior of the premises
without the prior written approval of Landlord. Tenant shall
present to Landlord any plans or specifications for such work
at the time approval lr. sought. Tenant shall promptly pay
all contractors and material men so as to minimise the
possibility of a lien attaching to the leased premises, and
should any r.uch lien be made or filed, Tenant shall bond
against or discharge the same within ten (10) days after
written request by Landlord.
IB. LANDLORD'S MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. Landlord
shall be responsible (as originally installed by Landlord
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pursuant to its obligations hereunder) for maintenance of
roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior painting,
yard surfacing, plumbing equipment, electrical equipment,
heating and sir conditioning equipment, trash removal, snow
removal and glass breakage except that Landlord shall not be
called upon to make any such repairs occasioned by the act or
negligence of Tenant, Its agents, employees, invitees,
licensees or contractors, except to the extent that Landlord
is reimbursed therefore under any policy of insurance
permitting waiver of subrogation in advance of loss*
Landlord shall not be required to make any other Improvements
or repairs until Tenant, in writing has notified Landlord of
the condition requiring repair.
19.
TENANT'S MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES.
Tenant
shall be responsible for all interior decoration, light
globes and tubes, interior walls, floors and ceilings. If
Tenant refuses or neglects to commence to complete repairs
promptly and adequately. Landlord may, but shall not be
required to do so, make and complete said repairs and Tenant
shall pay the costs thereof to Landlord upon demand.
20.
UTILITIES.
Landlord shall be responsible for
water, sewer, and fire insurance on the building. Tenant
shall be responsible for all power utilized by Tenant, heat,
telephone, janatorial, and fire insurance, on personal
property. Te4titoV*U*t\ be WL*p*a«Mfcl« fefWi c F h *fen>lfciU
21. SURRENDER OF PREMISES. At the termination of the
tenancy hereby created, Tenant shall deliver to Landlord the
leased premises in the same condition as the leased premises
were in upon delivery of possession thereof to Tenant,
together with Landlord's approved remodeling, reasonable wear
and tear accepted, and damage by unavoidable casualty
accepted, and shall surrender all keys for the leased
premises to Landlord at the place then fixed for the payment
of
rent and shall Inform Landlord of all combinations to
locks, safes and vaults, if any, in the leased premises.
Tenant
rhall
remove all
its trade
fixtures before
surrendering the premises and shall repair any damage to the
leased premises caused thereby.
Tenants obligations to
observe or perform this covenant shall survive the expiration
or other termination of the term of this lease.
22.
LIABILITY INSURANCE.
Tenant shall, during the
entire term of this lease, keep in full force and effect a
policy of public liability and property damage insurance with
respect to the leased premises, and the business operated by
Tenant and any sub-tenants of Tenant in the leased premises,
in which the limits for public liability shall be not less
than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) per accident, and in
which the limits for property damage liability shall be not
less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). The
policy
shall
name Landlord,
any
persons, firms or
corporations designated by Landlord and Tenant as Insureds,
and shall contain a clause that the insurer will not cancel
or change the insurance without first giving the Landlord ten
(10) days prior written notice.
Such Insurance may be
furnished by Tenant under any blanket policy carried by it or
under a separate policy therefore.
Evidence of said
insurance shall be delivered to Landlord and if Tenant fails
to provide such insurance Landlord may do so and charge same
to Tenant.
23. OFF-SET STATEMENT. Tenant agrees within ten (10)
days after request therefore by Landlord to execute in
recordable form and deliver to Landlord a statement in
writing, certifying
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(a) That this lease is in full force and effect,
(b)

The date of commencement of the term of this

lease,
(c) That rent is paid currently without any offset or defense thereto,
(d)

The amount of rent, if sny, paid in advance,

and
(e) That there are no uncured defaulta by Landlord
or stating those claimed by Tenant.
24.
ATTORNMENT.
Tenant shall, in the event any
proceedings are brought for the foreclosure of, or in the
event of exercise of the power of sale under any mortgage or
deed of trust made by Landlord covering the leaaed premiaes,
attorn to the purchaser upon any such foreclosure or sale and
recognize such purchaser as the Landlord under this lease.
25.
SUBORDINATION.
Tenant agrees that this Leaae
shall, at the request of Landlord, be subordinate to any
first mortgages or deeds of trust that may hereafter be
placed upon said premises and to any and all advances to be
made thereunder, and to the interest thereon, and any
renewals, replacements and extensions thereof, provided the
mortgagees or trustees named in said mortgages or deeds of
trust shall agree to recognize the Lease of Tenant in the
event of foreclosure, if Tenant is not in default.
26.
EXECUTION BY LANDLORD. Tenant hereby irrevocably
appoints Landlord as attorney-in-fact for the Tenant for full
power and authority to execute and deliver in the name of the
Tenant
any
such offset, attornment
and
subordination
instruments upon failure of the Tenant to execute and deliver
any of the above instruments within fifteen (15) days after
written request so to do by Landlord; and such failure shall
constitute a breach of this lease entitling the Landlord, at
its option, to cancel this Lease and terminate the Tenant's
Interest therein.
27.
WASTE OR NUISANCE.
Tenant shall not commit or
suffer to be committed any waste upon the leased premises, or
any nuisance or other act or thing which may disturb the
quiet enjoyment of any other tenant in the building in which
the leaaed premises may be located.
2B.
DESTRUCTION OP LEASED PREMISES. The parties hereto
agree that should the premises herein described be destroyed
during the term of this lease or any extensions or renewals
thereof to such an extent that the same cannot be put into
tenantable condition by Landlord within a reasonable time
then and in that event either party shall have the right to
the return of all advanced unused rentals, provided, however,
that should Lessor be able to restore the premises to a
tenantable condition within a reasonable time from said
destruction, then Tenant shall not be entitled to cancel said
lease, but shall not be obligated to pay rent for that period
during which the premises are being restored to said
tenantable condition; and provided, further, that should
Tenant be able to occupy a portion of the premises for the
purposes of this Lease during such time as the same are being
restored to the original condition by Landlord, then and in
that event, Tenant shall pay rent for the portion of the
premises being co ured in proportion to the rent for the
entire demised premises, such rent to be pro-rated on the
basis of square footage. Landlord shall have the election
not to repair or rebuild said building and shall, within.
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•incty (90) days after the occurence of such damage or
destruction, give Tenant notice of its intention to repair
and shall then proceed with reasonable speed to repair.
Tenant shall be solely responsible for Tenant's trade
fixtures, inventory and personal property and Landlord's
reconstruction obligation shall not include murals, works of
art, or abnormal decorative treatments of Tenant's premises.
29. EMINENT DOHAIK. All damages that may be awarded
for a taking under the power of eminent domain, whether for
the whole or a part of the leased premises, shall belong to
and be the property of Landlord whether such damages shall be
awarded as compensation for diminuition in value to the
leasehold or to the fee of the premises; provided, however
that Landlord shall not be entitled to the award made to
Tenant for loss of business, depreciation to, and cost of
removal of stock and fixtures, and if the whole of the
premises hereby leased shall be taken under the power of
eminent domain then the term of this lease shall cease aa of
the day possession shall be taken and the rent shall be paid
up to that day with a proportionate refund by Landlord or
such rent as may have been paid in advance. If less than the
whole is taken then the rental shall be reduced in proportion
to the amount of the leased premises taken.
30. DEFAULT. In the event of any failure of Tenant to
pay any rental due hereunder within fifteen (IS) days after
the same shall be due, or any failure to perform any other of
the terms, conditions or covenants of this lease to be
observed or performed by Tenant for more than thirty (30)
days after written notice of such default shall have been
mailed to Tenant, or if premises become and remain vacant and
abandoned by Tenant or if Tenant permits this lease to be
taken under any Writ of Execution, or in the event of the
insolvency of Tenant or of any guarantor of the lease, then
the Landlord, besides other rights or remedies it may have in
law and equity, shall have the right to relet and collect a
deficiency, the right to collect immediately for damages and
shall have the right to declare this lease terminated antf the
term ended and shall have the immediate right of re-entry and
may remove all persons and property from the leased premises
and such property may be removed and stored in a public
warehouse or elsewhere at the cost of, and for the account of
Tenant, without evidence of notice or resort to legal process
and without being deemed guilty of trespass, or becoming
liable for any loss or damage which may be occassioned
thereby.
31. LEGAL EXPENSES. In the event of default by either
party hereunder, the defaulting party hereby agrees to pay
all costs incurred in enforcing this agreement or any right
arising out of the breach thereof, whether by suit or
otherwise, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
32. WAIVER OF REDEMPTION FLIGHTS. Tenant hereby waives
any rights of redemption granted by or under any present or
future laws in the event of Tenant's being evicted or
dispossessed for any cause, or in the event of Landlord's
obtaining possession of the premises by reason of the
violation by Tenant, of any of the covenants or conditions of
this lease, or otherwise.
33.
BANKRUPTCY, INSOLVENCY OR RECEIVERSHIP. Neither
this Lease, nor any interest therein created nor any estate
thereby created shall pass to any trustee or receiver or
assignees for the benefit of creditors or otherwise by
operation of law.
In the event such should occur then
Landlord may at its option terminate this lease and all
rights of Tenants hereunder, by giving to Tenant noice in
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riting of the .lection of Landlord to so t.r»in.te.
.,,..«. r»p ruTBY

Landlord or Landlord's agents

may deem necessary or oesireaoie «nu in«A* */« «**vww *» *•*«
all material into and upon said premises that may be required
therefore without the same constituting an eviction of Tenant
in whole or in part.
During the six months prior to the
expiration of the term of this lease or any renewal term,
Landlord may exhibit the premises to prospective tenanta and
place upon the premises the usual notices "To Let" or "For
Rent* which notices Tenant shall permit to remain thereon
without molestation.
35. LANDLORD'S LIEN. Tenant hereby grants to Landlord
a lien upon the improvements, trade fixtures and furnishings
of Tenant to secure full and faithful performance of all of
ther terms of this lease.
36.
HOLDING OVER.
Any holding over after the
expiration of the term hereof, with the consent of the
Landlord, shall be construed to be a tenancy from month to
month at the rents herein specified (pro-rated on a monthly
basis) and shall otherwise be in the terms and conditions
herein specified so far as applicable.
37.
SUCCESSORS.
All rights and liabilities herein
given to or imposed upon the respective parties hereto shall
extend to and bind the several respective heirsf executors,
administrators, successors and assigns of the said parties;
and if there shall be more than ne tenant, they shall all be
bound jointly and severally by the terms, covenants and
agreements herein. No rights, however, shall inure to the
benefit of any assignee of Tenant unless the assignment to
such assignee has been approved by Landlord in writing, which
approval will not be unreasonably witheld.
38.
OUIET ENJOYMENT.
5*> long as Tenant is not in
default hereunder, he may ha-'e peaceful and quiet enjoyment
of the premises.
39.
WAIVER.
One or more waivers of any covenant or
condition by Landlord shall not be construed as a Waiver of
subsequent breach of the same covenant or condition and the
consent or approval to or of any subsequent similar act by
Tenant. No breach of a covenant or condition of this Leaae
shall be deemed to have been waived by Landlord, unless such
waiver be in writing signed by Landlord.
m
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This Lease and any exhibits
* *"*

h t

" ° f ' " * ^ / t h all the

covenants,
promises,
agreements,
conditions
and
i2£l5 U * ndln i 9i **"••» U n c o r d and Tenant concerning the
leased premises and there are no oral covenants, promises,
agreements, conditions or understandings between them other
than are herein set forth.
No subsequentalteration!
amendment, change or addition to this Lease shall be binding
upon Landlord or Tenant unleaa reduced to writing and signed
by each party.
41. NOTICES. All notices required or permitted under
this leaae of any communication for billing, correspondence
and any other legal purpose whatsoever shall be deemed
effective if given in a written communication through the
United States mail, postage prepaid, registered or certified,
and addressed as follow*:
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LANDLORD

Any change of address as above indicated nay be Bade by
giving notice to the address above indicated*
42.
RECORDING.
Tenant shall not record this Lease
without the written consent of Landlord, however, upon the
request of either party hereto, the other party shall join in
the execution of a nemorandum or so-called "short form" of
this Lease for the purpose of recordation. Said memorandum
shall describe the parties, the leased premises, the tern of
this lease, any special provisions and shall incorporate this
lease by reference.
43. TRANSFER OF LANDLORD'S INTERESTS. In the event of
any transfer or transfers of Landlord's interests in the
premises, the transferor shall be automatically relieved of
any and all obligations and liabilities on the part of
Landlord accruing from and after the date of such transfer,
provided the transferee assumes such obligations and
liabilities.
44.
SEVERABILITY. if any term, condition or covenant
of this lease or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance shall be invalid or unenforcibie, the remainder
of this Lease or circumstances other than those as to which
it has been held invalid or unenforciMe, shall be uneffected
thereby and each term, covenant or condition of this lease
shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent
permitted by law.
WITNESSES:

LANDLORD:
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CASE AUTHORITY
Case attached.
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AIGNER v. COWELL SALES CO.

Colo. 907

Chtatt60fJMN7 (Cola IMS)

xnents, which had been filed with the court
prior to the habeas corpus hearing, satisfied
Phil AIGNER, a/k/a Phillip R.
the constitutional requirement of probable
Aigner, Petitioner,
cause in an extradition proceeding, e~g.,
v.
Michigan v. Doran, supra; Pippin v. Leach,
188 Colo. 385, 534 ?2d 1193 (1975), and the COWELL SALES COMPANY, a Colorado
corporation, Respondent
statutory requirements of the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, section 1S-19No. 81SC215.
104, C.R.S.1973 (1978 RepLVoL 8). Because
Supreme Court of Colorado,
a prima facie case for extradition had been
En Banc.
established, the burden devolved upon
April 4, 1983.
Lucero to prove by clear and convincing
evidence either that he was not a fugitive
from Kansas or that he was not substantialLandlord brought action to recover
ly charged with a crime in that state. Kg.,
against
tenant for rent due under lease
Lomax v. Cronin, 194 Colo. 523, 575 P.2d
after
tenant
had vacated leased premises.
1285 (1978); Dressel v. Bianco, 168 Colo.
The
District
Court,
Arapahoe County, Joyce
517, 452 P.2d 756 (1969); Capra v. Miller,
S.
Steinhardt,
J.,
entered judgment for
161 Colo. 448, 422 ?2d 636 (1967).
landlord, and tenant appealed. The Court
Before presenting any evidence on his of Appeals, 634 P.2d 997, affirmed. Certioown behalf, Lucero could have moved the rari to review decision was granted. The
court for an order dismissing the return and Supreme Court, Rovira, J., held that in abmaking the writ absolute on the ground sence of express provision in lease granting
that the extradition documents failed to landlord right, upon reentry or forfeiture,
establish the legality of his arrest and de- to look to tenant for unaccrued rent, tenant
tention as a fugitive. If the motion had who vacated leased premises in compliance
been made, the court had the discretion with landlord's notice to pay or quit premiseither to rule on the motion at that point or es was not liable for rent due under lease
to decline to rule until the close of all the agreement for subsequent months during
evidence. See C.R.C.P. 41(bXl). In this which landlord was unable to rent premises.
case, however, Lucero failed to make any
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
such motion; instead, he acquiesced in the
burden properly plaoed upon him by the
court. The district court concluded at the 1. Landlord and Tenant *=>94(3)
close of all the evidence that Lucero's testiGenerally, notice to pay or quit premismony was not sufficient to overcome the es constitutes an election by landlord to
prima facie case established by the extradi- terminate lease unless notice is rendered
tion documents on file with the court. Un- ineffective by tenant's payment of rent
der these circumstances there is no merit in
2. Landlord and Tenant «=» 194(1)
Lucero's claim of procedural error.
Any lease provision providing for conThe judgment is affirmed.
tinuing liability for rent after tenant's quitting of premises pursuant to notice must be
strictly construed.
3. Landlord and Tenant «=» 194(1)
In absence of express provision in lease
granting landlord right, upon reentry or
forfeiture, to look to tenant for unaccrued
rent, tenant who vacated leased premises in
compliance with landlord's notice to pay or
quit premises was not liable for rent due

908

Colo.

660 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

under lease agreement for subsequent
months during which landlord was unable
to rent premises.
A. Daniel Rooney, Aurora, for petitioner.
Phyllis G. Knight, Huntington C. Brown,
Denver, for respondent
ROVIRA, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review a decision of the court of appeals holding the
petitioner, Phil Aigner, liable for rent. Cowell Sales Co. v. Aigner, 634 P2d 997 (Colo.
App.1981). We affirm in part and reverse
in part
The respondent, Cowell Sales Co. (Cowell
or landlord), leased two units in an Arvada
shopping center to petitioner to be used as a
laundry. The term of the lease was from
May 5, 1978, until April 30, 1981. The
monthly rent specified in the lease agreement was $733.33 for one unit and $333.33
for the other.
On May 2, 1979, Cowell served Aigner a
"Demand For Payment Of Rent Or Possession" because Aigner was delinquent in his
rent. The notice stated, in pertinent part,
that the tenant should, within three days,
"either pay [rent due] or deliver to the
undersigned the possession of said premises." Within the three-day period specified
in the notice, Aigner removed his equipment and vacated the premises. Cowell
then posted a "for rent" sign and on August
1, 1979, leased the premises to a new tenant
Cowell subsequently brought an action
against Aigner to recover rent due under
the lease for the months of May, June, and
July 1979. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Cowell for $3,187.88, the
full amount of the rent for these three
months.
Aigner appealed to the court of appeals,
arguing that the "Demand For Payment Of
Rent Or Possession" constituted an election
of remedies on the part of the landlord and
that the lease was thus terminated, relieving him of liability for subsequently accruing rent The court of appeab disagreed,

relying on certain language in the lease
agreement
The meaning and effect of two paragraphs in the lease are at issue here. The
first paragraph states, in pertinent part:
"[I]f the rent above reserved, or any part
thereof, shall be in default . . . the said
landlord may declare this lease terminate
ed, and after the expiration of three days
from the date of the service of a written
notice to that effect, be entitled to the
possession of said premises without any
further notice or demand
"
The relevant part of the second paragraph states:
"\J]n case said premises are left vacant
and any part of the rent herein reserved
be due and unpaid, then the landlord
may, without in anywise being obliged so
to do, and without terminating the lease,
retake possession of said premises and
rent the same for such rent, and upon
such conditions as the landlord may think
best, making such changes and repairs as
may be required, giving credit for the
amount of rent so received less all expenses of such changes and repairs, and
said tenant shall be liable for the balance
of the rent herein reserved until the expiration of this lease."
The court of appeals held that the second
quoted paragraph gave the landlord the
right to collect rent accruing after Aigner
quit the premises. However, we do not
believe that this paragraph governs under
the circumstances of this case. We agree
with the dissent in the court of appeals that
the second paragraph applies only when the
tenant unilaterally vacates or abandons the
premises and the landlord does not accept
the premises as a surrender.
[1] The general rule in Colorado is that
a notice to pay or quit constitutes an election by the landlord to terminate the lease
unless the notice is rendered ineffective by
the tenant's payment of rent Barlow v.
Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239 (1938).
The facts in Barlow are similar to those in
the case before us. Hoffman leased certain
property to Barlow, who fell behind in his
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rent Hoffman sent a notice to pay or quit
We held that the lessor's notice was "analo- FLIGHT SYSTEMS, INC, Plaintiff-Apgous to a notice which one who is a party to
pellee and Cross-Appellant,
any terminable contract gives in order to
•.
rescind it at law, as distinguished from equity." 103 Colo, at 291, 86 ?2d at 241. We ELGOOD-MAYO CORP- Defendant-Aprelied on section 4, c 70, '35 C.S.A., which
pellant and Cross-Appellee.
provided that "a failure to pay such rent,
No. 80CA0705.
upon demand, whenever made, shall work a
forfeiture." This language is essentially
Colorado Court of Appeals,
the same as the present section 13-40Div. II.
104(lXd), C.R.S.1973. Moreover, the applicable provisions of the lease and the deDec. 16, 1982.
mand to pay or quit in Barlow were subRehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1983.
stantially identical to those in the case before us.
The court of appeals held that the generSeller of electric control panels brought
al rule concerning the effect of such notice action for balance of purchase price. The
was avoided by the second paragraph quot- District Court, City and County of Dened above, which stated that if the premises ver, George M. McNamara, J., entered judgwere "left vacant" the landlord could take ment from which both seller and buyer
possession and hold the tenant liable for appealed. The Court of Appeals, Van Cise,
subsequent rent.
J., held that: (1) material alteration pro[2,3] Any lease provision providing for posed for addition to sales contract was not
continuing liability for rent after the ten- expressly agreed to by seller and did not
ant's quitting of the premises pursuant to become part of contract; (2) Court of Apnotice must be strictly construed. Knight peals would not disturb trial court's finding,
v. OMI Corp., 174 Mont. 72, 568 P.2d 552 based on conflicting evidence, as to amount
(1977); Walling v. Christie & Hobby, Inc.,of credit or setoff to be allowed; (3) inter54 S.W^d 186 (Tex.CivApp.1932). As the est on amount of judgment for purchase
Supreme Court of Montana stated in price of panels was recoverable from date
Knjght, supra, "In the absence of clear lan- amount became due; and (4) trial court
guage expressly preserving such right, erred in basing principal amount of judgcourts generally will not construe a lease as ment on "target price" of panels.
providing that, upon reentry or forfeiture,
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in
the tenant shall remain liable for unaccrued
rent" 174 Mont, at 75, 568 PJ2d at 554. part, and cause remanded with directions.
There is no such express provision in the
lease at issue here. Consequently the general rule applies, and the tenant is liable for 1. Appeal and Error «=» 1010.1(10)
rent only through the date he quit the
Trial court's finding that purchase orpremises.
der was not contract, but mere confirmaThe judgment of the court of appeals is tion of oral contract, and that provision in
therefore reversed to the extent that it purchase order calling for acceptance by
provided for rent after Aigner quit the third party was not part of contract, but
premises, and affirmed to the extent that it merely proposal for addition to contract,
provided for rent prior to that date.
being based on competent evidence, was
binding on review.
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2. Sales «=>22(4)
Proposal for addition to sales contract,
making payment for goods contingent upon
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